J & J Philippines -Case
J & J (PHILIPPINES), INC. â€”
JOHNSON'S FACE POWDER (A)1
Professor John Kennedy prepared this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
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The product line in 1989 included the following product groups and brands:
Baby products: Johnsonâ€™s baby powder, baby oil, baby shampoo, baby lotion, and baby soap; buds; cottonette; Johnson & Johnson Disposable Diapers.
Feminine hygiene products: Modess, Carefree, Stayfree, and Feminex.
Personal care products: Bandaids, Johnson & Johnson Dental Floss, Reach Toothbrushes; Shower to
Shower Soap, Powder, Shampoo and Conditioner.
Over-the-counter drug products: Tylenol tablets and capsules, Co-Tylenol tablets.
The products were sold by a company salesforce both direct to retailers, and through wholesalers.
Distribution channels for J & J were as follows: supermarkets, wholesalers, van dealers, grocery stores, drug chains, independent drug stores, market stalls, sari-sari stores (downscale corner variety stores), department stores and institutions. Direct accounts included department and large general merchandise stores, supermarkets, and some drug outlets. Most drug outlets had not evolved from traditional pharmacy-oriented product categories to nearly the same extent as in North America. Supermarkets, on the other hand, were very well developed in relation to their North American counterparts. They occupied large square footage, carried a broad range of product categories and, with retail margins of 5% to 8%, priced aggressively. A number were owned by